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Empirical evidence  on three assertions commonly-made by population
policy advocates about the  relationships among population growth, human
capital formation and economic development is  discussed and evaluated in
the light of economic-biological models of household behavior and of its
relevance to population policy.  The  three assertions are  that  (a)
population growth and human capital investments  jointly reflect  and respond
to  changes  in the economic  environment, (b) larger  families directly impede
human capital formation, and (c) the  inability of couples  to  control
fertility is  an important determinant of  investment in human capital.  The
evidence  suggests  that widely-observed correlations among population growth,
human capital and economic variables, which admit  to  alternative
interpretations, are  far stronger than are  the estimates  from studies whose
objective is  to quantify the causal mechanisms underlying the  three
assertions;  however, there  is  empirical  support for each.The role  of population growth  in economic development has become a
controversial issue in recent years.  One of the principal relationships
singled out by participants in debates about  the consequences of population
change  is  that between population growth and human capital formation.
Indeed, one characteristic which distinguishes markedly low- from high-
income countries  is  the  extent to which families  choose  to allocate
resources to  increasing the number of children they have relative to
increasing investments  in the human capital of each of their children.
Table  1 presents correlations among per-capita GNP, population growth, and
school enrollment rates  for 94 countries circa 1970-80.  The broad picture
they display is  clear--high-income  societies have low rates of population
growth and high rates of schooling and literacy;  countries with high rates
of population growth are also characterized by low school enrollment and
literacy rates.  Within countries  too,  large families  also tend  to be
families  in which children have lower levels  of schooling, health, etc.
(National Academy of Sciences,  1971).
Debates concerning the appropriate policy mix for promoting economic
growth can, I  think, be summarized by three assertions about the meaning of
the relationships among population growth, human capital and economic
development, each of which  is consistent with the  correlational evidence:
Assertion (a):  Population growth and human capital  investment rates
reflect the economic circumstances  of a country;  the  observed mix of
large  families and low levels of health, nutrition and schooling are
symptoms,  not causes, of  a lack of economic development.  Governments
and international development agencies should therefore focus on
promoting  (or removing impediments  to)  economic development and not on
families'  decisions about their size.
1Table  1
Correlations Among Per-Capita GNP, Population Growth,





GNP,  1980  -.18
Female school enrollment rates, ages  10-14  -.31  .49
Male school  enrollment rates, ages  10-14  -.19  .44
Literacy rate  -. 47  .54
Source:  Jasso and Rosenzweig,  (1986).Assertion  (b):  Large  families contribute directly to lowering the
human capital of children; higher fertility--closer  spacing of
children, early childbearing, large families--impedes human capital
formation, for given resources.  Dissemination of information to
families about the negative consequences of high fertility for their
children and providing the means  for controlling fertility should be
high priorities for public agencies.
Assertion (c):  The inability of families  to control fertility reduces
the resources  families have for investing  in their children. Improving
access  to  fertility control  resources thus  is  important for augmenting
human capital formation.
The  three assertions are not, of course, mutually exclusive, and each
is consistent with the correlational evidence,  such as presented in Table  1.
This essay is  concerned with evidence that goes beyond correlations and that
can reject or support  the three assertions--what  is  the  evidence that
population growth and investments in human capital jointly respond to
changes  in the economic  environment, that altering fertility patterns
causally affects  the  characteristics  of the children born, or  that the
inability to  control fertility is  an important deterrent to human capital
investments?  I review empirical studies that I and colleagues have produced
over the  last decade whose objectives were  to  examine those  issues by
identifying causal--biological and behavioral--relationships between
characteristics  of the economic environment, fertility, and human capital
investments.
Evidence  cannot be  interpreted without a  theoretical framework.  And in
this case,  the framework must simultaneously allow for all of the causal
relationships proposed in the  assertions.  Section 1 of this paper,therefore, sets out a single economic model of the  household incorporating
both biological and behavioral mechanisms.  The model embodies many features
of household behavior that have been illuminated in recent work aimed at
formulating economic models of the household.  The household is  an
appropriate focus  for obtaining and evaluating evidence on the determinants
and consequences of population growth since that  is ultimately where
decisions about family size and human capital reside.
Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the essay describe,  in the light of the model
of Section 1, the kinds of evidence that are required to  test the  implicit
hypotheses embodied in each assertion, and present evidence from a number of
empirical  studies using similar and appropriate (in light of the model)
methodologies.  In each section, and thus for each assertion, results from
at least  two empirical studies  are discussed, as  an important consideration
in weighing evidence  is  the ability of results to be  replicated, and
replicated in different populations or environments,  if not by different
researchers.
In Section 5, I consider the question of whether  the relationships
between family size and human capital investments  posed in assertion (b) and
(c),  if true, are pertinent to  the question of whether public support of
family planning efforts are warranted from an efficiency perspective.  I
also present evidence pertaining to  the question of whether governments
allocate resources  in a manner which suggests  that there  is  a
complementarity between efforts  to  encourage human capital  investments  and
reduce population growth and which  is consistent with the findings on  the
relationships between population change and human capital formation.
Review of the evidence from studies I consider to  have shed light on
the empirical foundations  for assertions  (a),  (b),  and (c)  suggests thateach can be supported.  But the quantitative evidence  for any one is  not
overwhelming;  there are only a few studies in each case  that go beyond
correlations and the estimated magnitudes of the  causal relationships  are
small.  On the other hand, the studies, based on data from countries as
diverse  as Colombia, India, Malaysia, the  Philippines and the United States,
are consistent with the general hypothesis that parents respond to  increases
in the relative returns  to  investing in human capital, by both lowering
their  fertility and increasing investments in each of their children.  And
this comes about whether the changes  in relative returns are  induced by
alterations  in the cost or efficiency of  fertility control  or via changes in
rates  of return to  schooling that may accompany economic  development.
1.  A Model of Fertility and Human Capital  Investment
In this section I set out a simple model of household decision-making
incorporating fertility decisions  and human capital investments.  The model
illustrates  the variety of  relationships among population growth, income and
human capital investments  at the micro level and will be used in subsequent
sections  to  translate assertions  about these relationships  into testable
hypotheses.  To  simplify the presentation, I assume a one-period decision
horizon and full  information;  hence, the stochastic and sequential nature of
childbearing is  abstracted from, although the dynamics of these processes
will be discussed as  they relate  to  the testing of hypotheses.
An essential feature of  the  determination of population growth is  that
fertility is  a biological process;  resources must be used by households to  limit
the  supply of births rather than to  increase supply, as  for most other  "goods."
This can be expressed in its most basic form by using the construct of a
reproduction function, as  in (1):
4n'  <  0,
where N - number of births  (children), Z - resources used to  control births,
with n' < 0, and A - fecundity, the number of births that would occur in  the
absence of control (Z - 0).2  The household chooses  its  level of control Z,
but  fecundity  is  biologically  determined.
Human capital (H) is  also produced by the household.  The function
describing the  effects of changes  in household resources on the level of human
capital invested in each child is  given by  (2).
(2)  H - V + h(tcH tmH  X,N),  h,  h 2  h  > 0  h  <0.
Here, there are  four important human capital inputs highlighted:  the time of
c  m
the child t  (in school, medical care),  the  time of the mother t
H  H
purchased goods and services X  (e.g. books, medical  care),  and the number of
children.  The presence of the  latter  in (2) expresses the possibility that
fertility may have a direct  impact on human capital  (assertion (b));  that is,  a
change in family size may affect H, for given levels  of other human capital
inputs.
The human capital production function (2) also contains a term V which
reflects  inputs  influencing human capital not under the control of parents.  The
term captures, for example,  the  influence of environmental factors, such as  the
prevalence of disease, and biological  factors, possibly genetically transmitted,
which also directly, but exogenously influence H.  As with fecundity,  the human
capital  "endowment" may influence household decisions,  as described below.
Human capital earns  a return in the market.  Thus,
(3)  E - w(H, V)  l', w2 >  0
where  E - (adult) child earnings.  Parents also  invest  in their own human
(1)  N  - p  +  n(Z),capital.  For example,  the mother may accumulate skills while working, such that
her wage W will be a function of her work time,  as  in (4):
(4)  W - W(tm )  W' > 0
where  t m  - mother's time at work.
The budget constraint of the households  is:
(5)  F + WC(O - t  )N + tmW + ONE - pZ  + p NX + p Y
c
where F - non-employment sources of income, W  - wage rate of children, Q - time
available, pz  - price of fertility control  inputs, p  - price of X, Y -
household consumption, p  - price of Y.  The budget constraint incorporates the
possibility that children contribute income to  the household when not engaged in
human capital accumulation  (e.g.,  in school) and parents receive  some fraction 9
of  the earnings of "grown" children.
Finally, the parental welfare function is  described by (6);
(6)  U - U(N, E, Y).
Parents  "care about"  the number and adult earnings of their children, and the
level of household consumption.
The parents maximize  (6) subject to  (1) through  (5) by choosing the  levels
of Z, X, and Y and by allocating parental  and child time  across activities.  In
equilibrium, the marginal rate  of substitution (mrs) between  the number of
children and the time each child allocates to human capital production (in
school) is:
m  +  W'  wC(n  C
pX  +  - (-  t  )  - E + pz/n'
(7)  mrs  c-
'  H  ((NW/h I )-)The denominator of  (7) contains  the  returns  to  time  in school,  or  the  ratio
of the opportunity cost of school  time WC  to  the marginal  increase in earnings
associated with a unit increase  in school  time.  In the numerator of  (7)  are  the
resource costs  associated with addition of one child--the value of the purchased
human capital  inputs X, the value of the  mother's  time in  "child care,"
inclusive of the foregone costs of her own human capital accumulation--less the
value of children's contribution to  household resources when young and when
grown.  Also  in the numerator  is  the ratio of  the per-unit cost of  the fertility
control resource  to  the  "effectiveness" of control,  the derivative of  the
control function (1) with respect to Z.  Thus,  reductions in the  "costliness" of
fertility control--decreases in the purchase price  of contraception, pz  and/or
increases in the effectiveness with which a given increase  in the fertility
control  resource reduces  fertility (a change  in the  absolute value of n')--
influence in the  same way the trade-off between fertility and investments  in
schooling.  Both family planning interventions and the  costs and returns to
investments in children can thus potentially influence the allocation of
resources between human capital and family size.  In the next sections  I address
the questions  of how and whether, empirically, the  family size-human capital
association is  influenced by the economic environment and  the  costliness of
fertility control.
2.  Economic Development and the Schooling-Fertility Trade-Off
An important  implication of the household model  is  that measures  of the
associations between household income levels and fertility and human capital
investments  reveal little about  the influence of the  economic environment on
these decisions.  This  is because household income  itself  is determined along
with family size and schooling investments.  For example, how much time childrenspend at work time when young or the extent  to which mothers participate  in the
labor market clearly influence the  total level of household income, but are
jointly determined with  family size and other decisions  in the model.  To  test
the assertion (a) that the economic  environment determines the observed
association between population growth and investments  in human capital  it is
thus necessary to ascertain how the relative  returns to  investments  in family
size and human capital are  influenced by economic variables exogenous  to  the
household.  Testing proposition (a) requires, first,  that there be a clear
prediction with respect  to  the influences  of a variable characterizing the
economic  environment and, second, that the variable be measurable and vary
exogenously to  family size and human capital decisions.  Family income  fails  the
second criterion, as  noted;  but so does  the mother's wage rate,  for example,
since that  is potentially  influenced by her work time decision and thus  both by
the number of children she may want and her concern for their welfare.3  Evidence
on the effects of exogenous variations in fertility on the mother's wage rate is
presented below.
One good candidate variable  for testing the proposition that the economic
setting  in low-income countries  is  in part a cause  of both the high-family size
and low levels  of school  investment observed there  is  the child wage rate, W  in
the model.  The  'wage' of children cannot be importantly influenced by human
capital investments and wages of children are likely to vary spatially within a
country, since it  is  unlikely that young children are mobile or that the returns
from children constitute a sufficiently large proportion of total family  income
to make it worthwhile for parents  to  relocate in response to  child wage
differentials.  In contrast, spatial differentials  in gross returns to  skill
investments are likely  to be arbitraged, since the  costs of mobility for young
adults  are low.Is the higher, more immediate economic value of children a reason for the
larger family size and lower schooling investment rates  in low-income compared
to high-income countries--do higher values of Wc,  all other costs  the  same,  lead
to higher levels of fertility and lower schooling levels?  The effects of
changes  in Wc  derived from the model  are:
dZ  t  cdN c  H (8)  - n'[-SNN(-t H ) +  SNEWhlN]  +--
dWc  H  NEn'  dF
dc  t  tc  dE dt  t  dE
(9)  SEEN  +  SNE  (O-tH  ) +  -
dW C   Wlh I  dF
where S..,  i  - N,E are own compensated substitution effects, SNE is the
cross  compensated substitution effect between the number and the per-child
earnings  of children, and di/dF is the income effect.  Second-order
conditions  constrain the S..  to  be negative. Since the  effects of a change
in the  child wage on the  demand for fertility control  Z and on child time  in
school  depends on the sum of own and cross compensated substitution effects,
as well  as income effects,  it  can be seen  that only when SNE is  positive,
i.e.,  when adult child earnings E and family size N are Hicksian
substitutes, can the model yield an unambiguous result  (as  long as income
effects are  small).  In that case, higher levels  of child wages will  induce
a lower demand for fertility control  resources  (higher fertility) and a
lower demand for schooling (time)  investments--where  the economic value of
younger children is  high, an additional child is less  costly and the
opportunity cost of school time  is  higher.
If parents view family size and per-child earnings or well-being as
substitutes  (SNE>0)  then, definitionally,  increases  in the costs  of having
children or  decreases  in the costs of controlling fertility will not only reducefamily size but increase per-child investments.  The child-wage rate,
representing the returns to  younger children's  labor, both offsets  (reduces) the
cost of an additional child and is a component of (increases)  the cost
(opportunity cost)  of schooling.  In contrast, a decrease,  say, in the  direct
costs of human capital  investments  (px)  or a rise  in the gross  returns to human
capital  investments  (w')  increase the net returns to per-child investments but
render having an additional child less  costly as well.  Suppose,  as hypothesized
by Schultz  (1975),  increases in the  rate of technical change r raise  the gross
returns  to schooling;  i.e.,  a8w/ar >  0.  Then the effects of a change in r on
fertility control and per-child school  (time)  investments  are:
dZ  ao  NWc  a8  •N  aw dN 1 (10) --  - n'[-S  NN  - - SN  ]  + --  --  -
dr  a  W lhl  ar  n' ar  dF
dtCH   aw  NWc  8•  ON  aw  dE
(11)  -SN0  - - S  2  - +---  -
dr  NE3  EE  2  h  r  wh  8rdF dr  a7  whE  a  Wlhl  aB  dF
Here, own and cross-compensated substitution effects  offset each
other.  When family size and child "quality" are substitutes and parents'
total resources directly increase as a result of  their investments in their
children, technical  change or other factors  that raise  the net returns to
human capital have ambiguous  effects on fertility and human capital  invest-
ments.  Both fertility and per-child resources spent on children may in-
crease;  total expenditures on children must increase.  However, if transfers
from children to parents either do not depend on investments  in human capi-
tal  (0 - 0) or  if such transfers do not depend on the number of children,
then increases  in the returns to  schooling will lower  fertility and raise
investments  in schooling, as the first  terms disappear  in  (10)  and (11).
10The model thus suggests  that if per-child investment returns  and
fertility are  substitutes the development of an economy via technical
change, which lowers the value of unskilled relative to skilled labor
(lowering WC 0, increasing w'),  is likely  to  induce a substitution by
households away from large  families and towards more investments per child,
particularly where parents  do not rely heavily on support from their adult
offspring.  What is  the evidence?  Table 2 reports results from three
studies based on data from India and the Philippines that obtained estimates
of the effects of variations  in child wage rates,  given adult female and
male wages or earnings potential, on both fertility and child schooling.  In
all  three studies, based on national surveys  or  aggregate data, fertility
was higher and schooling lower where child wage rates were higher--family
size and per-child investment returns do appear  to be substitutes and to
respond to  the economic environment in a way consistent with the hypothesis
that parents are attentive to  the costs  and returns to  investments in
4
children.  The  estimates, while reasonably precise  in each case,  differ
widely  in magnitude--a ten percent increase in the child wage  increases
fertility by from .4 to 6 percent and lowers  the  schooling of children by .2
to  20 percent, with the most diverse estimates obtained from the same
country, although at  different levels of aggregation.
The "Green Revolution" in India also provides some evidence  on parental
responses  to changes  in the relative returns to human capital  investments.
An important feature of the Indian experience with respect  to  the
introduction of the newer high-yielding grain varieties  in the  early to mid-
1960s  is  spatial variability in the degree to which the  "revolution" took
hold.  Cross-sectional data from India collected in 1970-71  suggests that where
the  HYV seeds were selectively introduced, fertility rates appeared to decline
11Table 2
Estimates of  Child Wage Elasticities for Measures of Child Schooling and
Fertility:  India and the Philippines
School  Enrollment Rate  Fertility
India:  India:  India:
District  Mean  Enrollment  Philippines:  District  India:  Philippines:
Enrollment Rate,  Rate  Children  Schooling attainment,  Child-Women  Children  Children
Girls 5-14
a   5-14  children 10-20
c   Ratio  Ever Born  Ever Born
Child wage  -2.02  -. 034  -. 021  .59  .50  .036
elasticity  (2.05)  (1.70)  (1.61)  (2.90)  (1.71)  (2.05)
a.  Indian district-level  data.  From Table 3  in  Rosenzweig and  Evenson (1977).
b.  Indian household data (NCAER ARIS-Survey), non-farm households, from Tables 3  and 4 in  Rosenzweig (1982).
c.  Philippines household data  (1968 National Demographic  Survey),  from Table 3 in  Rosenzweig (1978).
d.  Child wage jointly significant and collinear  with adult male and female wages in  enrollment equation  for boys.
e.  Based on age-standardized measures of  marital fertility control.  Assumes no change in  marital patterns
associated with variations  in  child wages.
f. t-ratio in  parentheses beneath elasticity estimate.and school enrollment rates to  increase relative  to  other areas and to  their
prior levels  in the affected areas, for given levels of wage rates  (Rosenzweig,
1982),  although the pre-"revolution" baseline data  are of lower quality than are
the survey data.
The limited evidence from studies examining the economic determinants of
both fertility and schooling, attentive  to  the behavioral and biological
mechanisms highlighted in economic models of the household, thus do  tend to
support assertion  (a)--increases in the level and pace of economic development,
without direct family planning interventions, can lead  to reductions  in
population growth and increases in human capital investments  in children.  But,
the way in which economic development proceeds matters--rates of return to
intensive and extensive  investments in children must shift, as  they are likely
to do  as a consequence of technical change and/or  (exogenous) capital
deepening.  If so,  parents appear  to respond, in ways  consistent with
proposition (a).
3.  Biological Effects  of Fertility on the Human Capital  of Children
The effects of relative price changes on  the division of resources between
fertility resources and per-child  investments depends crucially, as was shown,
on parental preferences,  in particular, on parents'  subjective view of the
substitutability between family size and child quality in terms of household
welfare.  Assertion (b) which posits the existence of deleterious direct effects
of larger families on the human capital of children pertains, however, to
biological relationships between fertility and human capital.  The question here
is:  will a woman who bears more children or more closely spaces her children
reduce  the average human capital  (health, intelligence) of her children even if
she spends  the same resources  on each child?  In terms  of  the model this  is
a question about the characteristics  of the  human capital production func-
12tion  (2).  Testing this proposition therefore requires that  the influence of
changes in measures of fertility--the number of children, spacing, timing of
births--on measures of children's human capital (H)  be obtained controlling
for all other inputs  that also may directly influence H.
Lack of controls for other H inputs  that may be correlated with
fertility may lead to misleading inferences.  For example, fertility and
mortality may be positively correlated because parents living in unhealthy
environments expect their children to die more frequently.  They thus invest
less  in each child and bear more children.  Accounting for the  influence of
all relevant human capital  inputs,  including the possibility of
environmental or other factors directly affecting human capital outcomes
that are beyond the control of parents but taken into account by them, makes
it  difficult indeed to  obtain evidence on the question posed in proposition
(b).
Consider the case  in which data are available describing all of the
inputs  in  (2),  but  there  is  no information on the V term, the endowed or
environmental component of child human capital.  Attempts  to  fit some
parameterized form of the  function with least squares  or some other curve-
fitting method will result in consistent and unbiased estimates only if the
inputs,  inclusive  of the fertility variables, are not correlated with the
unobserved V term.  If parents know V and V varies in the population, will
the human capital  inputs,  in particular fertility, vary with human capital
endowments?  Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1982)  treated the special case  in which
the production function  (2) contained only X  as  an input.  They showed that
with an identical household welfare function as  (6) and a comparable budget
constraint, the effect of V on fertility is  given by
13dN  p  dN
(12)  ---  [hx1SNE  +-].
dV  h  dF
x
In that model, even without N directly affecting the human capital outcome,
variations  in endowed human capital  induce variations in fertility as  long
as  parents care  about the relationship between N and E.  In particular, with
the  simplified production function, parents with more endowed children bear
more children when the number of children and quality per child are Hicksian
substitutes, so  that higher fertility would be positively correlated with H,
controlling for X, even though fertility,  in this case, actually has no
direct influence on human capital.  In the more general case  of  (2),  the
result  is  less clear, depending on how fertility directly affects human
capital,  i.e.,  on hN  and hNN.  Estimates of fertility effects  on H are thus
likely  to be biased if  there is variation in unobserved factors influencing
human capital  that are known to parents.
Regardless of whether or not the existence of unobserved exogenous factors
is  accounted for in estimating  (2),  it  is still necessary to  account for all
relevant inputs directly affecting human capital  that are under the  control of
parents.  This  information is most likely to be complete  for early indicators
of child development, such as birthweight and infant morbidity and survival.
The number and variety of "inputs"  that could have directly affected an adult's
accumulation of human capital, aside  from his/her number of siblings and sib
intervals,  is  large indeed.  It  is not likely therefore that measures  of
associations between fertility variables and adult levels of human capital can
shed much light on the  question posed in assertion  (b).
A number of recent studies have estimated the biological determinants
of early human capital  indicators employing econometric methods that take
into account parental responsiveness to  unobserved (by the researcher) human
14capital endowments.  Rosenzweig and Schultz  (1983, 1987)  estimated the
effects on children's birthweight of birth order, maternal age at birth and
other direct determinants using instrumental variables, namely proxies for
input prices, based on random samples  of all  legitimate births in the United
States.  They found that estimates of  the effects of inputs  on birthweight
are sensitive  to whether or not the unobserved factors are  taken into
account.  Because  in the United States  in recent years  almost 40 percent of
births are first births, and family size  is low,  they could not find any
direct effects of birth order on birthweight, beyond a  (negative) first
birth effect.
Olsen and Wolpin  (1984) used a family fixed effects procedure to
estimate  the biological determinants of child survival based on a national
probability sample of households in Malaysia.  They looked at how
differences across  children within the  same family in birth order, spacing,
maternal age and other variables were associated with differences  in
survival.  This  technique purges out the  family human capital endowment, and
they found that  their results were quite sensitive  to whether or not
differences across  families in inherent child survival propensities were
taken into account.
The family fixed effects procedure used by Olsen and Wolpin assumes
that parents do not respond to  exogenous differences across  individual children.
That  is,  dynamic behavior is  assumed away.  It  is  a procedure faithful to  the
static model described in section 1 in which all children have  the same  (family)
endowment V  and there are no unanticipated events.  However,  if parent's
fertility decisions do  respond to unanticipated events or the  individual
characteristics  of their children, the  family fixed effects estimates will also
be biased and inconsistent.  For example, if parents have an additional child
15more quickly because their  last child dies  (the so-called "replacement" effect),
it will appear that shorter post-birth intervals increase the risk of death
even when in fact they do not.  Similarly, the mother may less  intensively
breastfeed a child who is  ill and who is  thus more  at risk of death, leading
to  overestimates of the true,  if any, mortality-reducing effects of
breastfeeding.6
Table 3 presents estimates of the effects of three fertility variables
on birthweight from two studies, based on data from Malaysia and Colombia,
that were obtained using a combination of within-family estimators, to  take
into account family endowment (and input) differences, and instrumental
variables, to  take  into account parental responsiveness  to  individual
endowment differences across children within the family.  The estimated
effects  (in elasticity terms)  are remarkably similar across data sets  from
two very different economic environments, a result to be expected if
biological relationships are being measured, as  is  the  goal.  Both studies
indicate that  the postponement of births, wider intervals between births,
and fewer births  increase biologically  the weight of children at birth, an
important determinant  (or correlate) of  infant mortality and subsequent
child development among surviving children.
The two studies  that appropriately control  for unobserved child and
family specific variability in human capital  endowments in estimating the
direct human capital effects of fertility behavior thus  support  the
contention that  lowering fertility directly benefits those children born,
when all  other parental behaviors are  the same.  The magnitude of these
direct effects appears  to be small, however--a doubling of the intervals
between births  (2.3 years to 4.6 years)  increases birthweight  only by from
2.6 to  5.6 percent;  the birthweight of a fifth child is  from four to  six
16Table  3
Estimates of Birth Spacing, Birth Order and Maternal Age Elasticities for
Birthweight, from Within-Family, Instrumented Production Function Analyses:
Malaysia and Colombia
Malaysiaa  Colombiab
Variable  Elasticity  Mean  Elasticity  Mean
Birth Order  -.16  2.5  -.24  4.6
(1.17)c   (2.08)
Prior birth interval  (months,  .026  27.3  .056  27.6
order>l)  (1.62)  (1.83)
Maternal age at birth (years)  .63  22.5  .76  23.5
(1.50)  (1.35)
Number of children  1458  238
a.  From Rosenzweig and Schultz  (1987),  Table 7.  Based on children of order two
and three only.
b.  From Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1987),  Table 2.
c.  t-ratio in parentheses beneath the elasticity estimate.percent lower  than his/her immediately preceding child;  postponement of
births by one year, for given spacing and number, increases birthweight by
from 1.4 to 3.2  percent.
4.  The Human Capital Consequences of Costly Fertility Control
The assertion (c)  that the inability of couples to  control fertility is a
principal cause of lower levels of investments  in human capital requires two
kinds of evidence.  First,  there must be evidence that the costliness of
controlling births  is  an important determinant of the actual number of births.
Second, it must be shown that parents  or households respond to "excess" birthq
by diverting resources  from per-child human capital investments.  For after all,
parents with larger families could choose to  reduce their  leisure time or
purchases of, say, transistor radios.
A seemingly-straightforward means of ascertaining both  the prevalence
and consequences of imperfect contraceptive control is  to  obtain information
from parents on unwanted or excess births.  Attempts to  relate parental
reports  of the number of unwanted births or pregnancies to measures of their
human capital investments  (Rodgers (198_) are, however, problematical.
First,  that a child or pregnancy is  unwanted ex post may be due  to reasons
other  than a couple's  inability to  control fertility perfectly.  In
particular, ex post  (post-fertility) "unwantedness" may be a function of
unrealized expectations, expectations  formed when fertility decisions were
originally made, regarding economic circumstances or the  "qualities" of the
as  yet unborn children. In societies  in which returns to  large  families have
been diminishing over time,  ex post reports of excess births may thus be
high, but do not necessarily signal a fertility control problem.
17A second problem with using reports  of excess births  to measure the
costliness of fertility control is  that couples' willingness to bear
"excess" children will clearly depend on the net cost of children  (Michael,
1973).  Both "excess" births--the number of additional births that would
have been averted if fertility control were costless--and desired births are
functions of the costs of children.  Thus,  in societies where the shadow
price of children is  low, actual, desired (under costless  control) and
excess fertility will be high.  In an environment having identical costs of
fertility control, but  in which the relative  returns  to  (costs of) large
families are  low (high)  however, excess births will be lower  (as will as
actual births and desired births).
Finally, if excess births as  well as human capital  investments are
likely to be correlated with economic circumstances,  it  is necessary to  look
at the consequences of variations  in "excess" births controlling for  those
circumstances.  But why should observationally  identical couples facing the
same economic environment report different numbers of unwanted children?
One  reason is  that couples  differ in their preferences--households in which
smaller per-child human capital investments  are preferred may be more
willing to  control fertility less perfectly, and vice versa.
In sum, direct, subjectively ascertained measures of excess  fertility
confound the costliness of control with (i) all discrepancies between
couples'  expectations and realizations,  (ii)  the  costs and returns  to
investments  in children, and  (iii)  couples' preferences.  The association
between such reports and human capital investments  in children thus do not
provide reliable evidence on how, or whether, decreasing the costs  of
controlling fertility would affect levels  of human capital.  There are
alternative methods  that can be used to  assess  the consequences of the
18costliness of fertility control, however.  One  is  to estimate the effects of
variation in pz,  the cost of contraception, on human capital investments  i.e.,
estimate  the cross price effect SNE by estimating dX/dpz or dtcH/dpz.  Studies
of the effects of family planning programs  (which either reduce p  or increase
(in absolute value) n'),  usually focus on births, or worse,  "acceptances" of
contraceptive services.  A number of studies have examined the  "cross"-price
effects of family planning, however.
Table 4 presents estimates  from three studies which have estimated the
effects  of various measures of programmatic family planning efforts on
measures of child survival and children's nutritional status.  In all three
studies, the effects  of family planning are measured net of the  effects of
health programs and parental schooling levels.  Each confirms  the evidence
presented in Table 2--raising the net costs of increasing family size,  in
this case via reductions in pz  (or increases in n')  induces  increased human
capital investments;  N and E are  substitutes.  The quantitative effects are,
again, small--a doubling of expenditures per capita on family planning would
reduce child mortality rates by from .7 to 3.7 percent  (urban Colombia);
children in families  fully exposed to  a local family planning clinic  are 3.4
percent heavier  than children residing in an area with no clinic
(Philippines);  a 20 percent  increase in the proportion of villages with a
family planning clinic would reduce child mortality by 4.4 percent  (rural
India).7
The principal difficulty with using community-based data on programs
to  estimate the effects of those programs on the behavior of households  is
that  the program distribution may not be  orthogonal  to unmeasured variables
influencing household behavior.  For example, programs may be placed where
the  demand for program services  is high, where the  environment is  least
19Table  4
Elasticity Effects  of Family Planning Interventions on Measures of Child Human
Capital:  Colombia, India and the  Philippines
Measure of Euman  Capital
Country and Measure  Normalized Child  Child Mortality
of  Family  Planning  Mortalitya  Rate  Weight for  Age c
Colombia  (national, urban):
Expenditures per capita in
municipios.
Mother  aged  30-34  -.037
(1.78)
Mother aged 35-39  -.022
(1.21)
Mother aged 40-44  -.007
(.038)
Mother  aged  45-49  -. 034
(1.90)
India  (national, rural):  Proportion
of villages  in district with clinic
-.22
(2.42)
Philippines:  (20 barrios) Proportion of
child's  life  exposed  to  clinic
.034
(2.76)
a.  Ratio of family's actual child mortality rate  (deaths/live births)  to  that
predicted on the basis of birth histories  in urban areas of Colombia.
Source:  Rosenzweig and Schultz  (1982),  Table  IV.
b.  Child deaths/live births.  Source:  Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1982),  Table  3.
c.  Weight divided by weight predicted for  child of given age  from national
Philippines age standards.  Source:  Rosenzweig and Wolpin  (1986),  Table  3.
d.  t-ratio  in parentheses beneath elasticity estimate.healthy etc.  (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1986a).  Conversely, households may
move  to  localities  that provide  services they prefer or can use most
efficiently  (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1986).  I consider some of these program
distribution issues  in somewhat more detail  in the next section.
A  third strategy for assessing the consequences of imperfect fertility
control for human capital investments  is  to exploit  the "natural" experiment
associated with the variability  in fecundity  in the human population,  in
the model.  Because fecundity is  likely to  be orthogonal to preferences and
robust  to  at least small changes  in the environment, this "variable" mimics
the ideal randomized experimental intervention of varying births
exogenously.  Moreover, if and only if fertility control  is costly can the
variability in fecundity influence the variability in family size  and,
possibly, human capital investments.  To  see  this,  consider the effect of a
change in p  on, say,  school time, allowing the household to  adjust all of
its  resources  optimally.  Rosenzweig and Schultz  (1987)  show that:
c
dtH  p  dE
(13)  - N  [n"SNEh 1  + -]
d,  n'  dF
Expression (13)  indicates that;  first, if pz - 0;  i.e.,  fertility control is
costless,  or n' - ; i.e.,  fertility control  is perfectly effective,
variations  in fecundity will not affect children's human capital no matter
how parent's perceive the substitutability between family size and the well-
being of each of their children.  In  that case,  fertility can be costlessly
adjusted so there are no consequences.  Second, with pz >  0, the association
between fecundity and schooling will be negative if family size and per-
child human capital are  substitutes.  The results in Tables  2 and 4 thus
20imply that couples experiencing exogenously a higher  "supply" of births will
invest less  in each child if  control is not costless.
Two methods have been used to measure fecundity.  Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(1980 and 1980b)  proposed that the behavior of couples experiencing a
multiple birth could be compared to  those couples not experiencing such
births  to  obtain unbiased estimates of  the effects of "excess" births.
Since  "twinning" is  uncorrelated with preferences and not subject  to choice,
such comparisons would not require  any information on the economic
circumstances of the couples, only information on birth histories and the
behavioral outcomes  of interest.  Since the probability that a couple
experiences a twin birth rises with the number of pregnancies, Rosenzweig
and Wolpin  (1980a) studied the  consequences of imperfect fertility control
for child schooling by using a measure of twins per pregnancy.  A better
method, implemented in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980b),  compares couples with
a twin on  the first pregnancy to other  couples.  The  "twins first"  method is
preferred since  at which pregnancy the multiple birth occurs may matter.
Indeed, in a regime of costless  fertility control, and where couples desire
at least two children, couples having a twin on the  first birth should not
behave very differently from other couples, unless  the timing of births is
important.  Couples experiencing a twin on their  last  (planned)  pregnancy,
however, cannot adjust their family size no matter what  the cost of
contraception.
A major practical shortcoming of the  twins  first method is  that less
than one percent of all  first pregnancies result  in multiple births.  Thus
very large sample sizes are needed to  exploit the natural  twins experiment.
Rosenzweig and Schultz  (1985) have proposed a method which also exploits  the
variability in fecundity but does not require unusually large sample sizes.
21In  this approach p is  measured by estimating the reproduction function (1).
If the parameters of (1)  are known, then the difference between a couple's
actual number of births and that predicted on the basis of their use of
fertility control  (and all other relevant)  inputs in  (2),  the  "residual,"
represents  that part of fertility which, definitionally,  is beyond the
couple's control;  i.e.,  for couple i,
(14)  /  - Ni - n(Z ).
The Rosenzweig-Schultz  residual method requires  detailed information
on couples'  contraceptive use and conceptions.  Moreover, estimation of the
reproduction function is not straightforward.  Couples will adjust their
contraceptive use to realized births, and thus  to p, just as,  as was shown,
couples allocate resources  in response to human capital endowments.  As  a
consequence, the unobserved p will be correlated with Z in (2) and the
estimation procedure must take  into account  the correlation.  Rosenzweig and
Schultz  (1985,  1987) used instrumental variables  to estimate the
reproduction function using data from the United States  and Malaysia.  Thus,
another data requirement of  their procedure  is  information on the
(exogenous) determinants of contraceptive control Z.  In both countries,
variation in fecundity was found to account for some portion of the
variability in actual births, although the proportion was small  - ten
percent in the United States,  three percent in Malaysia.
Table 5 reports estimates  of the effects on children's schooling
attainment of an exogenous increase in fertility by one birth, from a  study
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980a) applying the twins per pregnancy method, to
rural  Indian data, and from a study (Rosenzweig and Schultz,  1987) based on
the  residual method, applied to Malaysian data.  Both estimates  indicate,
22Table  5
Estimates of the Percentage Change  in Children's Schooling Attainment due  to One
Unanticipated Birth Using Two Methods:  India and Malaysia
India  Malaysia
Method  Age-Standardized Schooling Index  Mean Years of Schooling
Twins per pregnancyc  -34.0
(3.22)
Residual fecundityd  -8.3
(1.62)
a.  Source:  NCAER-ARIS.  Mean of actual  schooling of  (non-twin) children of age
i in family divided by average schooling for all persons aged i in
population.
b.  Source:  Malaysian Family Life  Survey.  Includes  expected schooling
attainment for households  in which children are still attending school.
Original specification also  includes mother's  schooling attainment, mother's
age,  husband's  earnings.
c.  Estimate assumes 7 pregnancies for average family, from Table 2 in
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980).
d.  Fertility of couple net of age of mother, breastfeeding and use of
contraceptive methods. From Tables  5 and 6 in Rosenzweig and Schultz  (1987).
e.  t-ratio  in parentheses beneath coefficient.consistent with the estimated child wage effects of Table 2 and the
estimated family planning effects  in Table 4, that per-child human capital
and family size are substitutes.  Assertion (c) is  confirmed--the inability
to control fertility perfectly lowers, on average,  the human capital of
children.
To obtain comparable quantitative effects across the two methods, the
residual measure of fecundity obtained from the Malaysian data was converted
into excess births using the estimated effect of a change in p  on cumulative
births  in that  study, i.e.,  an estimate of dN/dM;  since dtc /dN - (dtc/d,)
-li
(dN/d)l1  . This procedure can also be used to  examine the  impact of
variation in  (exogenous) fecundity and thus excess births on the mother's
wage rate, to assess the effects of costly fertility control on the
accumulation of skills by married women.  Table 6 presents estimates of the
residual measure of fecundity on the  log of the weekly wage rate of married
women in the United States  (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1985)  and in Malaysia.
Both sets of estimates indicate that  the costliness  of fertility control
9 also results  in lower wage rates for married women.
Interestingly, while the direct wage effect of variations in fecundity
is  larger in the U.S.  than in Malaysia, the computed excess birth effect is
larger in Malaysia than in the United States.  This  is because the estimated
effect of a change in fecundity on births obtained in the U.S. study is
greater than in the Malaysia study.  It appears that the estimated fecundity
effects  on both births and wage rates are  smaller in absolute value in the
Malaysia study compared to  those estimates obtained using  the same
methodology applied to the U.S.  data set.  One possible reason for this  is
that, because any measurement errors  in the reproduction function inputs and
in births are  impounded in the residual measure of fecundity, estimates of
23Table  6
Estimates of Uncontrolled Fertility on the Log of Weekly Wage Rate  of Married
Women:  the United States and Malaysia
United Statesa   Malaysiab _
Unanticipated  Unanticipated
Variable  Coefficient  Birth  Effect  Coefficient  Birth Effect
Residual fecundityc  -5.28d  -.14  -1.24  -.36
(3 .20)  (3.80)
Mother's schooling  .0648  .117
(4.36)  (6.80)
-4
Husband's  income  (xl0  )  -. 134  .841
(2.72)  (1.91)
Rho  --. 901
(8.41)
Proportion of sample with  .64  .22
mother reporting wage
Estimation procedure  OLS  Maximum-Likelihood
Selection Correction
a.  Source 1975 National Fertility Survey.  From Table  7, Rosenzweig and Schultz
(1985).  Other regressors  include wife's age and husband's religion
affiliation.  Unanticipated birth effect computed for mothers aged 36.
b.  Source:  Malaysian Family Life Survey.  Fecundity computation described
in Rosenzweig and Schultz  (1987).  Other regressors  include wife's age and
race  (Malay, Chinese, Indian).
c.  See note c, Table 3.
d.  t-ratio  in parentheses beneath coefficient.fecundity effects on behavior are likely  to be biased to  zero.  The
retrospective contraceptive information in the Malaysian data set used (the
Malaysian Family Life  Survey)  is substantially less detailed than that
provided in the U.S. data (the 1970 and 1975 National Fertility Surveys),
and the estimates of the reproduction function used to construct the
fecundity measure  less precise.  It is  thus likely that  the fecundity
measure  in Malaysia contains a larger measurement error component than does
the comparable U.S. measure.  Estimated fecundity effects, measured using
the residual based on the reproduction function estimates, are  thus likely
to be biased more strongly to  zero  in the Malaysia than in  the U.S. study.
The more  negative excess birth effect on child schooling based on the twins
method in Table 4 and the less  negative excess birth effect on the wage in
Table 5 are likely  to be better estimates  than the comparable estimates
obtained from the Malaysia data set.  The  studies from all three populations
using both methods, however, do  indicate that there  is  a loss of per-person
human capital among children and mothers as a result of fertility control
costs.
5.  Externalities and the Optimality of Family Planning Subsidies
Evidence of the existence of imperfect  fertility control and its
deleterious consequences  for human capital  investments and evidence on the
success of family planning programs  in augmenting such  investments are not
sufficient to justify the allocation of public monies  to the  subvention of
fertility control,  at least on efficiency grounds.  If the  price of
fertility control reflects  its social  resource costs then the actual  level
of  "excess" fertility, defined, arbitrarily, in terms of the complete
absence  of such costs,  is  optimal in the sense  that no one  in society could
24be made better off without someone also being made worse off through the
reallocation of resources.
Justification for governmental family planning interventions  (inclusive
of their financing) based on efficiency criteria requires  that the total
private  cost of raising children borne by households not appropriately
reflect the total social cost.  As embodied in  (7),  the  tradeoff faced by
parents between having an additional child and investing more resources in
each child depends on the  costs and returns  to human capital  investments as
well as  on the costs of controlling fertility.  Discrepancies between
parental private and social returns  to  family size decisions  can be sought,
therefore, not only in terms of  the externalities associated purely with
population size or growth;  e.g.,  crowding, but also in terms of human
capital externalities.  The desirability of  the  subvention of fertility
control does not, therefore, require  the existence  of direct negative
externalities associated with population, using purely efficiency criteria.
To test assertions about the efficiency of  family planning
interventions would require quantitative evidence on externalities, on the
private and social resource costs of rearing children, but there  is  little,
if any evidence.  However,  there appears  to be  an almost universal belief in
the  desirability of directly subsidizing human capital  investments, as
evidenced by the pervasiveness of public expenditures on schooling and
health.  Do  the presumed externalities  associated with human capital
investments also justify, on efficiency grounds, family planning
interventions  in the absence of evidence on population size externalities?
This  question was  investigated in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1986a).  In that
study a model similar  to  that described by  (1) through  (6) was modified to
25incorporate a human capital externality and the possibility of cross-
household transfers contingent on behavior.
Suppose that, for  some  ("wealthy") households the human capital
production function (2) includes as  an input the  (average) human capital of
other "poor" households.  For simplicity, as  in Rosenzweig and Wolpin's
study, assume that  the purchased good X and fertility (of the household) are
the only other human capital  inputs;  i.e.,
(15)  H - h(X,N,H*),
where H* - mean human capital of  the children in poor households  and hi > 0,
i  - X,N,H*.  There  is thus a positive externality associated with human
capital  in the production of human capital, and poor households  do not take
into account the  (positive) impact of their human capital investments on
wealthy households.  (For additional  simplicity, the  possible impact of
their human capital investments on each other is  ignored).  Of course,  there
may be other kinds of externalities associated with human capital.  Lucas
(1986),  for example, embodies externalities from education in the technology
of goods production, which plays a central  role in the process of
development.
The wealthy households could (selfishly) subsidize  the human capital
inputs of the poor to induce them to  increase their investments  in human
capital.  If so, such an arrangement would be Pareto optimal;  both  types of
households would be better off.  The budget constraint of the wealthy
households,  incorporating (i) subsidies  to  fertility control to  poor
households, s  ,  and  (ii)  subsidies to human capital  inputs,  sx,  is  then:
(16)  F - pZ +  pXN  + Ts  Z  + Ts Nx  . z  x  z  x
26where  F - the number of poor households, and the  superscript p indicates
that the variable is  controlled by the  poor households.
If  it  is  assumed that Z is used in proportion to  the number of births
averted, y-N, the optimal ratio of the fertility control subsidy  to  the
market price of the fertility control input,  in equilibrium, is:
p
z)  -1 PNXeHH*  p  ,P  p -
(17)  P--T  [e  +  PHN]  - ( I I p  )-I  (  )p p  HX  p  Npz  P
Pz  PzN  PHX  N,p 
z
XP  X,PZ
+  s  --  [1  +  p  -- ],
P  N,p
where  eHi - elasticity of H with respect to human capital input  i, from (2)
or  (15);  ip  - price elasticity of input i (i-X,N) with respect to  the iP.
price of i among poor households.
Expression  (16)  indicates that if there  is  no human capital externality
(eHH*-O)  and, therefore no subsidy to human capital inputs  (sx-0) there is
no positive level of the family planning subsidy that is  optimal, no
justification for  "family planning" subsidies no matter what  the magnitude
or direction of cross price effects  or the biological effects of  fertility
on human capital.  Conversely, if eHH*>0  and there are subsidies to  human
capital,  family planning subsidies are also optimal.  The intuition for  this
result  is clear--since the human capital subsidy  is paid for each child
born, the  fewer the number of children born the lower the  total cost of the
human capital subsidy;  expenditures on family planning decrease the  costs of
increasing average human capital levels.  Moreover,  (16)  indicates that the
27family planning subsidy is larger if  (i)  family size and human capital are
substitutes  (  Xp  <0 ), and  (ii)  increasing family size lowers human capital
directly  (eHN<0).  Thus, the estimates  reported in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5
provide evidence  that supports higher levels of family planning  subsidies
for the purpose of raising avearage human capital  levels, but are not
evidence of the optimality of such subsidies.  Such evidence  is not
sufficient to justify the  existence of public family planning  interventions.
Does  the actual distribution of  family planning programs and
institutions suggest  that governments use  such programs primarily to more
efficiently induce  greater human capital  investments?  The model suggests
that (i) where human capital programs  (health, schooling) exist, there would
also be family planning subsidies;  i.e.,  there would be few examples of
human capital programs unaccompanied by family planning.  On the other hand,
family planning subsidies  can substitute for human capital  subsidies since
family size  and per-child human capital appear to be viewed as substitutes
by parents;  family planning programs without human capital programs might be
observed.
Table 7 presents information on the  actual distributions of public
family planning and health facilities  across communities  in one province of
the Philippines, Laguna, from Rosenzweig and Wolpin  (1986a),  and from the
Malaysian Family Life Survey (Butz and DaVanzo,  1978),  which included 50
communities (out of 52  surveyed) with information on both types of
institutions.  Both distributions conform to  the notion that  family planning
programs complement efforts to  augment human capital (health)--75 and 86
percent, respectively, of the communities  in Laguna and in Malaysia either
had both types of facilities or neither.  In Malaysia, of those 7
communities with one program, it was  a family planning facility in six.  In
28Table  7
Joint Distributions of Family Planning and Health Facilities:
Laguna, Philippines and Malaysia
Laguna. Philippinesa   Malaysiab
(Barrios)  (PSU villages)
Number  Percent  Number  Percent
Total localities  20  100  50  100
With both fp  and health or neither  15  75  43  86
both  10  50  37  74
neither  5  25  6  12
With only one  facility  5  25  7  14
only fp  2  10  6  12
only health  3  15  1  2
a.  Source:  Rosenzweig and Wolpin  (1986),  from 1979 Laguna Survey.
b.  Source:  1976 Malaysia Family Life Survey (Butz and DaVanzo,  1978).Laguna, only 3 of the  20 barrios had a health facility but no family
planning program.
These patterns describing the spatial distribution of family planning
and health facilities suggest  the extent  to which governments are concerned
with human capital development.  They also  suggest that evaluations of  the
effects of family planning must take  into account the  effects of other
programs, whose placement  is highly correlated with that of family planning.
Rosenzweig and Wolpin,  for example,  report that the  (Spearman rank)
correlation between the  initiation dates  of the  two programs in Laguna was
0.62.  The correlation between the proportion of villages with family
planning facilities  and with health clinics across the  300 kabupaten in
Indonesia in 1980 was  .45 (Pitt and Rosenzweig, 1987).  The purposive
placement of public programs also  opens up  the  possibility that the
distribution of programs over space and over time may be  correlated with
characteristics of the environment or  the population that are not measured
by the researcher, but which are  important determinants of both fertility
and human capital investments, e.g.,  V in  (2).  Correlations between program
efforts and household decisions  may thus not constitute reliable evidence on
program effects when such programs are allocated efficiently by public
agencies.
6.  Conclusion
In this essay I have reviewed a  number of empirical  studies that have
attempted to move beyond the correlational evidence usually brought to bear
in policy debates on population and development.  These studies have sought
to  quantify the causal mechanisms that underly the  observed strong
associations among population growth, human capital investments and economic
29development and that have been asserted to be important by policy advocates.
The methods used in and the empirical  findings from the studies discussed
illustrate both the difficulties of establishing a solid empirical
foundation for  these  issues,  in the absence of experimentally-based data,
and the frailty of the actual evidence pertinent to  the extreme, but not
mutually exclusive, positions assumed by participants in debates about  the
role of population growth in economic development.
Certain regularities  emerge, however.  Evidence from studies, based on
data from countries as  diverse  as  the United States, Colombia, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines and informed by models of household
behavior incorporating many of the biological processes associated with
human reproduction and development indicate  that fertility, human capital
investment behavior and economic  development are linked in several ways.  In
particular, (a) returns  to  investments  in skills appear  to directly affect
both the levels of  investments in skills  and family size decisions,  such
that in most cases  fertility falls and human capital investments per person
rise when such returns  increase,  (b) rapid, early and prolonged child
bearing directly diminish the human capital of children, even when all  other
resource  allocations are unchanged, presumably due to biological mechanisms
(but mechanisms yet unsupported by a biological model),  (c) difficulties in
controlling fertility contribute to  lower levels  of human capital and,
relatedly, attempts to  lower the  costs of fertility control appear to
increase human capital levels, and  (d) governments appear to  treat human
capital and population control programs as  complementary, seemingly because
of a concern for promoting human capital  formation.
None of these empirical  findings are  surprising;  what is  important,
however,  is  that the magnitudes of all of these causal  relationships appear
30to be relatively small.  The observed correlations among fertiliity rates,
human capital investments, and levels  of development thus  appear to
overestimate considerably the various  causal connections between these
phenomena that are asserted to be important by policy advocates.  In any
event, the relationships quantified do not provide a justification for any
particular governmental intervention on efficiency grounds, although they do
suggest  the consequences of interventions, ranging from attempts  to
encourage technical change  to  family planning initiatives.  In that regard,
empirical studies that would attempt  to clarify and quantify the
relationships between the  levels of physical investment and population
growth, informed by considerations similar to  studies that have addressed
human capital-fertility issues, would also be useful  in anticipating some of
the consequences of economic development policies, but these appear to be
almost entirely absent from the  literature.
31Footnotes
1.  The model embodies the  interaction between child quantity and quality
in the household budget constraint (Becker and Lewis,  1973),  the  role of the
mother's time  (Willis, 1973),  the economic value of children  (Rosenzweig and
Evenson, 1977),  the production of human capital by heterogeneous households
(Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1983),  and the biology of reproduction  (Easterlin,
et al.,  1980 and Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1985)  emphasized in prior studies
formulating models of the household.
2.  Other reproductive inputs--e.g.,  age,  breastfeeding--can readily be
incorporated.
3.  Of course,  there may be exogenous  forces determining the wage rate of
women;  if these can be identified, and vary over  the  sample space, they can
be used to  test assertion (a).  Schultz  (1986) makes use  of exogenous shifts
in the  relative prices of commodities  that are produced via technologies
more  or  less  intensive  in female  labor to  identify the  effects of changes in
maternal wage rates on fertility based on Swedish time-series data.  The
prediction of  the model with respect  to  the effects of  exogenous variations
in women's wages on human capital  investments or  schooling are, however,
less  clear than that for the effects of child wage rates,  as  discussed
below.
4.  In the study  (Rosenzweig and Evenson, 1977)  making use of aggregate
data, the possibility that higher fertility rates  or lower  school enrollment
rates might lower child or adult wage rates was  taken  into account using
such instrumental variables as  rainfall and industrial  infrastructure to
predict wages.
325.  Wolpin (1983)  formulates and estimates a dynamic stochastic model of
fertility incorporating survival risk which calls  into question the simple
replacement hypothesis.
6.  Evidence on responses by parents  to  individual endowments of children
is  presented in Rosenzweig  (1986) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1986b).
7.  In the Colombia study  (Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982),  no evidence of
the effects of family planning expenditures or health clinics on either
fertility or morbidity could be found in rural areas.
8.  The Rosenzweig-Wolpin (1986a) study of the effects of family planning
on child development in Laguna, Philippines did attempt to  take into account
the endogeneity of program placement;  results were sensitive  to whether or
not placement was "controlled for."
9.  In the Rosenzweig and Schultz  (1985)  study based on U.S. data, no evidence
was found of selectivity bias resulting from using a sample of working women to
estimate wage determinants.  In the Malaysian sample, a far lower proportion of
women was participating in the wage labor market  (in part because of the
possibility of self-employment) and sample  selectivity was significant.  Note
that because  it is assumed that prior work time influences current wages,  it is
difficult to  find  (exogenous) variables  influencing whether or not a woman is
currently in the wage labor force that is  also not a determinant of her current
wage.  In both exercises involving the effects of exogenous  fertility variation on
the maternal wage rate,  the  role of selectivity is  essentially  identified based
on the assumption of a  bivariate normal distribution for the unobservables.
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